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   nnovation Research IAbstract 
Taxing imports from regions which are not subject to climate policy and subsidi-
zing exports into these regions have recently been proposed to address presu-
med negative effects of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) on in-
dustry competitiveness and carbon leakage. This paper analyzes the economic 
and environmental effects of alternative border tax adjustment (BTA) mecha-
nisms using an extended version of the GTAP-E model that explicitly includes 
domestic trade and transport margins. The BTAs are imposed on regions which 
have not committed to emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol or which failed 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The analyses distinguish between effects of the 
BTAs on the EU15 countries and on the rest of the EU (REU). Likewise, the 
analyses single out the effects of climate policy with and without BTAs on do-
mestic output changes which are due to changes in import competition and ex-
port competitiveness. Implementing a BTA whose power is equal to the percen-
tage change in production costs in the energy-intensive sectors in the EU has 
different impacts for those sectors in the EU15 countries compared with the 
REU countries. In the EU15, the BTA effectively neutralizes import competition 
in the energy-intensive sectors while enhancing the export competitiveness of 
these sectors. Conversely, in the REU, the BTA is not effective in neutralizing 
increased import competition or decreased export competitiveness because the 
majority of trade by the REU is with countries/regions that are not included in 
the BTA. Overall, implementing a BTA has little effect on the marginal abate-
ment costs of achieving the emission reductions in the Kyoto Protocol and does 
little in reducing carbon leakage. 
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1 Introduction 
Partial implementation of environmental policies in some regions will not lead to 
a cost-efficient outcome in case of transnational externalities. Yet such policies 
are observed in the context of international climate policy. In particular, in the 
Kyoto Protocol only so called Annex B countries have committed to reduce 
greenhouse gases by approximately 5.2% from the 1990/1995 base year levels 
during the first commitment period of 2008-2012. Even though the United States 
and Australia refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, adopting members implemen-
ted the agreement in 2005. In the same year, the European Union launched an 
EU-wide trading scheme (EU ETS) for CO2-emissions generated by companies 
in the energy industry and other carbon-intensive industry sectors as its key 
climate change policy instrument. Approximately 12,000 installations are cur-
rently covered by the EU ETS and account for nearly 45% of total CO2-
emissions, and about 30% of all greenhouse gases in the EU (CEC 2005). The 
purpose of the EU ETS is to allow EU Member States to achieve their Kyoto 
greenhouse gas emission targets at minimum cost. However, this partial imple-
mentation of emissions trading may result in competitive distortions for carbon-
intensive companies like producers of cement or steel in the EU. Since partici-
pating in the EU ETS increases the marginal production costs, depending on 
the carbon intensity of the production process and the price for EU allowances, 
companies from these sectors which export to regions that have not implemen-
ted climate policy would be disadvantaged since the additional (opportunity) 
costs may generally not be passed on. Likewise, EU companies that face import 
competition from companies in regions that have not implemented climate 
change policies would also be at a competitive disadvantage.1 Because of the-
se changes in competitiveness, the production of energy-intensive products 
may shift to regions without climate change policies. This would lead to carbon 
leakage and a smaller reduction in global CO2 emissions if firms in these count-
ries employ less carbon efficient production processes. As a consequence, 
BTAs may also allow regions to take leadership in terms of climate policy. For 
example, the EU has committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 
by 20%, even if there was no Post-Kyoto agreement.  
                                            
1  Since in the EU ETS at least 90% of allowances have to be allocated for free for the period 
2008-2012, actual costs to companies would be lower than the opportunity costs. However, 
competitiveness is determined by the marginal costs, which under ideal conditions do not 
depend on whether allowances are allocated for free or auctioned off.  2  Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments 
To address these concerns, border tax adjustments (BTA) have recently been 
proposed by academics (e.g. Ismer and Neuhoff 2004, Grubb and Neuhoff 
2006, Stiglitz 2006), industry associations (e.g. CEMBUREAU), and politicians. 
The proposed border adjustments would tax imports from regions that have not 
implemented climate change policies and subsidize exports to those regions. 
The tax and subsidy rates would correspond to the additional (opportunity) 
costs imposed on like commodities produced in the EU. Thus, the higher the 
carbon tax (implied through emission trading), the higher will be the tax burden 
on imported commodities and the higher the subsidy on EU exports.2 Current 
proposals for a US national greenhouse gas trading system include provisions 
which are similar to a BTA and are meant to induce participation of those count-
ries in a global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions which failed to take 
appropriate measures. According to the Lieberman-Warner America’s Climate 
Security Act of 2007, importers of greenhouse-gas-intensive manufactured pro-
ducts from such countries would have to submit emissions allowances of a va-
lue that matches that of the allowances domestic manufacturers pay under the 
US system.3
In practice, at least three types of problems may arise with the implementation 
of a BTA mechanism. First, because of information costs and information a-
symmetry, it may be difficult to determine the appropriate level of the import ta-
riffs and export subsidies that offset the loss of competitiveness. Ideally, the 
power of the BTA would be set equal to the percentage change in costs from 
implementing climate change policies. However, this may be difficult to measure 
and there would be incentives for firms to include cost increases not associated 
with climate change policies to obtain larger tariffs and export subsidies. Se-
cond, the set of commodities which would be subject to the BTA have to be de-
fined. Annex 1 of the EU Emissions Trading Directive lists the types of installati-
ons which are directly covered by the EU ETS. However, since the EU ETS not 
only increases prices of final commodities, but also of intermediate commodities 
such as electricity, the competitiveness of companies which do not participate in 
the EU ETS but intensively use these intermediates, may also be affected nega-
tively. Sectors indirectly affected by the EU ETS include, in particular, the alu-
minum and large parts of the chemical industry. Third, it is doubtful whether 
                                            
2   Other remedies discussed to address incomplete regulatory coverage include output-based 
allocation of allowances or rebate systems (see Demailly and Quirion 2006, Demailly and 
Quirion 2007b, Fischer (forthcoming), or Bernard et al. 2007). 
3  See  http://lieberman.senate.gov/documents/acsa.pdf Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments  3 
 
BTA would be compatible with current WTO/GATT rules (e.g., van Asselt and 
Biermann 2007). Notably, Ismer and Neuhoff (2004) argue that a BTA would be 
allowed under WTA rules if it is based on emissions of best-available technolo-
gies (BAT).  
In this paper we analyze the economic and environmental effects of the EU 
implementing a BTA policy employing a static version of the GTAP-E model that 
also includes domestic trade and transport margins. Such margins are particu-
larly relevant for some of the sectors included in the EU ETS such as cement or 
lime producers. Peterson and Lee (2005) have shown that the impact of energy 
taxes on prices and emissions may be significantly overstated if the domestic 
trade and transport margins are not explicitly modeled. The power of the BTA is 
set equal to the percentage change in costs for sectors that are subject to the 
BTA, with the BTA being imposed on two alternative sets of industries: those 
industries directly participating in the EU ETS and those industries directly or 
indirectly affected by the EU ETS.  
This paper extends existing applied general equilibrium (AGE) based analyses 
of the EU ETS (including Klepper and Peterson 2006, or Kemfert et al. 2006) 
which do not allow for BTAs (and not for transport margins), and do not distin-
guish between effects on the EU15 and the REU countries. It complements e-
xisting analyses on BTAs for selected sectors such as steel and cement based 
on partial-equilibrium models (including Demailly and Quirion forthcoming, De-
mailly and Quirion 2007, and Mathiesen and Mæstad 2004). Finally, the paper 
distinguishes the effects on domestic output which result from changes in import 
and export competitiveness.  4  Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments 
2 Model  Description 
The model employed is an extended version of the static GTAP-E Model (Burniaux 
and Truong 2002). This model is based on the perfectly competitive, multi-region, 
multi-sector GTAP model (Hertel and Tsiagas 1997). Because the GTAP-E explicitly 
models substitution possibilities between energy inputs and between energy and 
capital; and also tracks CO2 emissions, it has been frequently used in the analysis of 
climate change policies (e.g. Kremers et al. 2002, Nijkamp et al. 2005 or Kemfert et 
al. 2006). Our model extends the GTAP-E model by including domestic trade and 
transport margins.  
2.1  Regional Household Demand 
In each region, there is a single aggregate household that represents the con-
sumption side of the model. This regional aggregate household collects all of the 
factor income and tax receipts and spends this income on private consumption of 
goods and services, government consumption, and savings. The utility function for 
the aggregate regional household consists of two levels. At the top-level, a Cobb-
Douglas utility function is specified such that shares of private consumption, go-
vernment consumption, and savings remain constant. At the second-level, a non-
homothetic Constant Difference Elasticity of substitution (CDE) utility function is 
used to represent preferences for private consumption. Also at the second-level, a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function is used to represent preferences for government con-
sumption. 
2.2 Production 
Similar to the GTAP-E model, a nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) pro-
duction structure, as illustrated in Figure 1, is specified in the model. Each sub-nest 
in the production structure represents the potential for substitution between individual 
or composite inputs. Each composite input is composed of the commodities at the 
next lower level in the tree structure of Figure 1. Beginning at the top of the producti-
on structure, firms produce output by using non-energy intermediate inputs and a 
primary factor composite (or value added). Typically, the elasticity of substitution 
between the primary factor composite and non-energy intermediate inputs (σT) is 
assumed to equal zero. This implies a constant per-unit-of-output input use of all 
non-energy intermediate inputs and the primary factor composite. The primary factor 
composite is composed of land, skilled labor, unskilled labor, natural resources, and 









































































































































































































































































































































Within the capital-energy co
sibilities: (a
mic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments  6 
mposite, there are three inter-fuel substitution pos-
) electricity versus non-electricity composite (σELY); (b) coal versus 
non-coal composite (σCOAL); and (c) between oil, gas, and petroleum products 
(σFU). For example, producers may substitute coal for non-coal fuel (a composi-
te of oil, gas and petroleum products) when coal becomes more expensive than 
non-coal fuels. Firms may also substitute the energy composite (σKE) for capital 
when the aggregate energy price decreases relative to the capital rental rate. 
As pointed out by Burniaux and Truong (2002), the advantages to this specifica-
tion is that it allows f r substitution between fuels and the potential for capital 
and energy to be either substitutes or complements, depending on the values of 
the elasticities o bstitution chosen.  
2.3  Incorporating Domestic Margins 
Domestic margins, which drive a we  purchaser pri-
ces, have been incorporated into
per, we follow the specification of
hin (2006), and Peterson (2006). This approach specifies a nested CES structu-
re shown in Figure 2. At the top of this structure is a composite commodity that 
is pu sed by the private household, government household, or firms. Similar 
to the GTAP-E model, the composite commodity is a combination of the margin 
inclus omposite imported commodity and a margin inclusive domestic 
commodity (see Level 3 of Figure 2), where σD is the elasticity of substitution 
between the composite import and the composite domestic commodity. Note 
that the composite commodities include domestic trade and transportation mar-
gins. At Level 2, the composite imported commodity and the domestically pro-
duced commodity are combined with a composite marketing service. Based on 
the work of Holloway (1989) and Wohlgenant (1989), the potential for substituti-
on between the composite comm  composite marketing service is de-
noted as σpt. As shown in Level 1, the composite marketing service is itself a 
CES aggregate of all trade and transportation services needed to get the good 
from the producer to the purchaser. The constant elasticity of substitution σpm 
governs the degree of substitutability ween individual marketing services, 
such as land and air transport, as relative prices vary. Note that levels 1 and 2 
do not exist in the GTAP-E model. 
o
f su
dge between producer and
omestic margins used by Bradford and Go-
 AGE models in a v
 d
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In addition to applying domestic margins on the purchases of all agents in the 
model, domestic margins are also applied on all commodities that are exported. 
 
two-level ne omestic trade 
 
At the top level, this  combined with exports to 
create the f.o.b. expor
2.4 CO2
The emission of CO sumed to be 
 
gas, and petroleum and coal pr 2 emissions 
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where CO2 is defined as millions of metric tons (MT) emitted; (C/V) is the a-
mount of CO2 ion tons of oil equivalent); (V/Q) is the 
mtoe per unit of energy commodity; QFD QFM are the level of domestic 
and imported intermediate inputs; QPD and  M are the level of domestic and 
imported energy commodities purchased by the private household; and QGD 
and QGM are the level of domestic and im urcha-
sed by the government. So the terms (C/V  
of the energy commodity into the level of CO  emissions. The percentage chan-
ge in CO
These margins represent domestic trade and transport services utilized to get
the commodity from the producer to the port of departure. Similar to Figure 2, a 
sted CES structure is utilized. At the bottom level, d
and transport services are combined to create a composite marketing service.
 composite marketing service is
t composite commodity. 
 Emissions 
2 per unit of energy commodities used is as
constant across users and regions, but varies by energy commodity (coal, oil,
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where   is the percentage change in CO2 emissions; EDINT,  EMINT, 
EDHH HH, EDG EMGV are the amount of CO2 emitted from do-
gco2
, EM V, and Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments  9 
 
mestic and imported intermediate energy inputs, domestic and imported energy 
commodities consumed by the private household, and domestic and imported 
energy commodities consumed by the government households; and qfd, qfm, 
qpd, qpm, qgd, qgm, are the percentage changes in the use of energy commo-
dities by firms, private households, and the government. 
2.5  Carbon Tax and Emission Trading 
A carbon tax, both on a real and nominal basis, is used to represent the margi-
nal abatement costs in the model. The level of the carbon tax is endogenously 
epends on the level of quantitative restrictions on 
(3) 
where NCTAX(r) and RCTAX(r) are the nominal and the real carbon tax rat  
region r and GDPIND(r) is the GDP deflator of region r. The change in the no-
minal tax rate is specified as: 
determined in the model and d
CO2 emissions in the Annex B countries. When emission trading is permitted, 
one may interpret the carbon tax as the value of CO2 permits.  
In levels form, the nominal carbon tax is specified as: 
()    () * () NCTAX r GDPIND r RCTAX r = , 
e for
() () ( ) ( )    *+ 0 . 0 1 * * ( ) nctax r GDPIND r rctax r NCTAX r pgdp r = , (4) 
where nctax(r) and rctax(r) are the changes in the nominal and the real carbon 
tax rates for region r and pgdp(r) is the percentage change in the GDP deflator 
in region r. 
When a group of countries join an emissions trading scheme, the marginal aba-
tement costs are equalized across countries through the trading of CO2 emissi-
on permits. In terms of equations (3) and (4), this implies that NCTAX(r) is e-
qualized in all participating countries. Formally, the value of traded emissions 
permits is specified in the model as:  
() () ( ) 22 2 * DVCO TRA r CO Q r CO T r NCTAX r =− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ( )
 (5) 
where CO2Q(r) is the CO2 emissions quota for region r; CO2T(r) is the total CO2 
emissions of region r; and DVCO2TRA(r) is the dollar value from CO2 emissions 
trading of region r. If DVCO2TRA(r) is negative, country r is buying emissions 10  Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments 
permits, as it emits more than its allocated quota. If DVCO2TRA(r) is positive, 
country r is selling emissions permits, as it emits less than its allocated quota. 
The change in the dollar value of emissions trading is specified as: 
() () ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 20 . 0 1 * * 2 * 2 -  2 * 2 dvco tra r NCTAX r CO Q r gco q r CO T r gco t r =+ ⎡⎤ ⎣
() () () *2 -  2 , nctax r CO Q r CO T r
⎦
⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  (6) 
r effects on the purchaser 
price for a given level of the carbon 
achieve a comparable level of emission abatement. In addition, accounting for 
domestic transport costs is particularly relevant for the cement and lime indust-
where dvco2tra(r) is the change in dollar value from CO2 emissions trading; 
gco2q(r) and gco2t(r) are the percentage changes in the CO2 emissions quota 
and total CO2 emissions. 
The inclusion of domestic trade and transport margins in the model creates a 
wedge between producer and purchaser prices. Compared to models that do 
not account for domestic margins, this leads to smalle
tax. Thus, a larger carbon tax is needed to 
ries that are included in the EU ETS. Trade in these industries is restricted to 
about 200 km radius because of transport costs (Demailly and Quirion, forthco-
ming). Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments  11 
 
3  Data and Model Aggregation 
The data used to implement the model is based on version 6.0 the GTAP data 
base. Peterson (2006) has developed a domestic margin inclusive version of 
the GTAP version 6 data base that contains information on trade and transpor-
tation margins for all intermediate input purchases, purchases by households, 
and purchases by governments of domestically produced and imported 
modities. It also includes all domestic trade and transport margins required to 
e, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia, the United 
(ROA), China and India (CHIND), Japan, (JPN), the United States (US), 
Rest of Central and South America (CSAM), EU15, Rest of European Union 
(REU), Rest of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, (REFSU), and Middle 
East and Africa (MEAF). The European Union is disaggregated into two regions 
because of differences in CO2 emissions, product carbon content, and reduction 
targets between the EU15 and rest of the member states. Japan is identified 
separately from the rest of the Annex B countries due its larger amount of CO2 
emissions. The United States, Australia, and China and India are identified as 
separate regions because these are relatively large CO2 emitters and/or failed 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. All other composite regions are defined based on 
geographic proximity. Table 1 provides a detailed description of the regional 
aggregation.  
                                           
com-
get exports to the port of departure. This margin data is based on data from the 
Input-Output accounts of 22 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Estonia, Germany, Greec
Kingdom, and the United States). For regions where no margin data are avail-
able, average margin shares are used (see Peterson, 2006, for more details). 
The levels of initial CO2 emissions for each region by energy commodities are 
based on the GTAP version 6 energy data base. The base year of the data 
used in this analysis is 2001.4
An eleven region and seventeen commodity aggregation is used in this paper. 
The eleven regions are Australia (AUS), Rest of Annex B countries (ROB), Rest 
of Asia 
 
4   Because the base year is 2001, the GTAP version 6.0 data base contains trade barriers 
between some of the new EU member states, such as Poland, and other EU member sta-
tes. These barriers are removed in an initial simulation that creates an updated data base 
with no trade barriers between EU member states. We use this updata data as the base for 
all simulations conducted in this paper. 12  Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments 
Tab Regional/country Aggregation  le 1: 
Region  Description  GTAP Regions  Emission Target* 
EU15  EU15  aut, bel, dnk, fin, fra, deu, gbr, 
grc, irl, ita, lux, nld, prt, esp, 
swe 
-6.9%
REU  Rest  of  EU  bgr, cyp, cze, hun, mlt, pol, 
rom, svk, svn, est, lva, ltu 
33.0%
JPN Japan  jpn  -12.7%
REFSU  Rest of Eastern Europe & 
Former Soviet Union 
xer, alb, hrv, rus, xsu 
ROB  Rest of Annex B  can, che, xef, nzl  -25.1%
AUS Australia  aus 
CHIND  China and India  chn, hkg, ind 
MEAF  Middle  East  &  Africa  tur, xme, mar, tun, xnf, bwa, 
zaf, xsc, mwi, moz, tza, zmb, 
zwe, xsd, mdg, uga, xss 
CSAM  Central & South America  mex, xna, col, per, ven, xap, 
arg, bra, chl, ury, xsm, xca, xfa, 
xcb 
ROA  Rest of Asia  xoc,  kor, twn, xea, idn, mys, 
phl, sgp, tha, vnm, xse, bgd, 
lka, xsa 
US United  States  usa 
*  Based on Ziesing (2006). Total emission reduction of 5.2% across all Annex B regions 
The seventeen commodities/sectors in the model are agriculture (agr), food, 
coal, oil, gas, other natural resources (onres), paper products (ppp), petroleum 
and coal products (p_c), chemical, rubber, plastic products (crp), other mineral 
products (nmm), ferrous metals (i_s), other metals (nfm), other manufacturing 
(oman), electricity (ely), trade (trd), transport (trans), and services (serv). The 
sectors ppp, p_c, nmm, i_s, and ely are the GTAP sectors that most closely cor-
respond to those covered by the EU ETS. The sectors crp and nfm are also re-
latively larger users of energy and may be included in a BTA policy. Coal, oil, 
and gas represent the extraction of the fossil based energy commodities. Trade 
and transports sectors are identified separately because of their use in provi-
ding domestic margin services and relatively large use of petroleum products by 
the transport sector. Food, agr, onres, and serv are composite commodities that 
represent the remaining sectors. Table 2 provides a detailed description of the 
commodity/sector aggregation. 
 
 Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments  13 
 
Table 2:  Commodity/sector Aggregation 
Sectors  Sector Description  GTAP 
agr Agriculture  , c_b, pfb, o pdr, wht, gro, v_f, osd
oap, rmk, wol 
cr, ctl, 
food  Food  cmt, omt, vol, mil, pcr, s
coa 
gr, ofd, b_t 
coal Coal 
oil 
urces  mn 
ucts  ppp 
al products
stic pr
nmm*  Other mineral products 
nfm**  Other metal products 
cturing  p, mvh, otn, ele, 




gas Gas  gas,  gdt 
onres  Other natural reso frs, fsh, o
ppp* Paper  prod
p_c*  Petroleum and co   p_c 
crp**  Chemicals, rubber, pla oducts  crp 
nmm 
i_s* Ferrous  metals  i_s 
nfm 
oman Other  manufa tex, wap, lea, lum, fm
ome, omf 
trd Trade 
t s  Transport  otp, wtp, atp 
serv  Services  cmn, ofi, isr, obs, ros, osg, dwe 
* ETS  sector 
**  ETS affected sector 
The production, margin, and trade elasticities of substitution utilized in the mo-
del are listed in table 3. No substitution is allowed between non-energy interme-
diate inputs and value-added (σT). We also assume fixed margins and set the 
values of σpm and σpt equal to zero. The elasticities of substitution among the 
components of value-added (σVA) are set equal to those values in the GTAP 
version 6.0 data base. Because we believe that the elasticities of substitution 
between energy and capital (σKE), electricity and non-electricity (σELY), and coal 
and non-coal (σCOAL), and between non-coal energy intermediate inputs (σFU) in 
Burniaux and Truong (2002) are too large for the short to intermediate run, we 
consider alternative scenarios where the values of these parameters are set 
equal to 0.1 and 0.25 respectively.5 Following Burniaux and Truong (2002), we 
o not allow for substitution among energy commodities or between energy and 
             
d
                                
   In a recent micro-panel econometric study of industrial companies, Arberg and Bjørner 
(2007) find that electricity and other energy inputs are complements with capital rather than 
substitutes. 
514  Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments 
capital in ining and refining of fossil fuel  the m s (i.e., σKE, σELY, σCOAL, and σFU 
are set equal to zero for coal, oil, gas, and p_c). We also do not allow substituti-
o etween e nd non-electricity in 
the elasticities of substitution between domestic and the composite imported 
commodity (σ  between imported commo lues 
in the GTAP v6 data base with the exception of oil, where the trade elasticities 
are set equal to 30, reflecting the belief that crude oil is a more homogeneous 
commodity. 
Table 3:  argin, and Trade Elasticities of Substitution 
Margin  Trade 
n b lectricity a the electricity (ely) sector. Finally, 
D) and dities (σM) are equal to the va
Production, M
 Production 
Sectors  σT σVA σKE σELY σCOAL σpt σpm σD σM σFU
agr 0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.51  5.04
0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.49  5.04
0 0.0 0.0
oil 0.0  0.20  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 30.00  30.00
0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.03  33.04
s 0.0  0  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.40  2.44
0 0.1  0.1 0.1 0.0 2.95  5.90
0 0.0  0.0 0.0 4.20
1.26  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.30  6.60
6  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.90  5.80
i_s 0.0  1.26  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.95  5.90
0
3
.0  0.24  0.1  0.1
food  .0  1.12  0.1  0.1
coal  .0  0.20  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 3.05  6.10
0.0 0.0
gas  .0  0.62  0.0
onre 0.2 0.1
ppp  .0  1.26  0.1 0.0
p_c  .0  1.26  0.0 0.0 0.0 2.10 
crp 0.0 
nmm 0.0  1.2
nfm 0.0  1.26  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 4.20  8.4
oman 0.0  1.26  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.79  7.7
ely 0.0  1.26  0.1  0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.80  5.60
trd 0.0  1.68  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.90  3.80
trans 0.0  1.68  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.90  3.80
serv 0.0  1.28  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.91  3.80
CGDS 0.0  1.00  0.00  0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0  
 Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments  15 
 
4  Description of Scenarios 
4.1  Implementing Kyoto Without BTA 
To implement the Kyoto targets for the different regions in the model, we apply 
the reduction factors given in table 1 (for all greenhouse gases) to the CO2 e-
missions level of the regions, except for REFSU where no emission limits are 
applied. Applying the reduction rates to CO2 only implies a proportional reducti-
on in all greenhouse gases. We assume that Russia and the Ukraine use the 
excess 
permits (“hot air”) to other Annex B regions. This assumption may be rationali-
zed by Russia and the Ukra  bank the “
t n th s   n  din e m ket in  -201
which would, given the quantities olv re  in  gni nt dro rice
Also, other  x i  to cha  “hot a cau
of domestic political pressure from pow l  iron nta bby g . S
l the RE ls ds e ss  mit hic ou ffec e lev e c
bon tax when emission trading  llow .   th ore nsider rnati
scenarios where the REU banks  non or me  hei cess p ts. F
t mainin n  cou  em io edu n r s are t ffere
c etween    leve f em ion nd e K o ta ts. We e ch
s  base e on r ctio ate  t 200 ve ather t mis
o in the 2   yea f th ata ca  e sion n thes untri
h risen 2   en  1 a  20  Thus us  the ifferen twe
t 1 em on ls and the Kyoto  e ou nd timate redu
tion efforts required to achieve their targets.  
We also abstract from accounting for th e JI a CD redits over
ments or companies, recognizing at e lo g th instruments is likely 
b wn  g and total) emissi ed tion sts in the EU and other 
ountries. Trading of emission permits (AAUs) by countries/regions is 
llowed between Annex B countries other than REFSU, yielding the same (en-
dogenous) nominal tax rate on emissions in all Annex B countries. Within the 
Annex B countries, we assume that a single carbon tax is applied to all sectors, 
                                           
number of AAUs corresponding to their emissions, but they will not sell 
ine deciding to hot air” for likely tighter 
argets i e po t Kyoto period rather tha floo g th ar 2008 2, 
 inv ed,  sult a si fica p in p s.6 
Anne  B countries may not be w lling  pur se ir” be se 
erfu env me l lo roups imi-
arly,  U a o hol xce per s w h c ld a t th el of th ar-
is a ed We eref  co  alte ve 
all,  e,   so of t r ex ermi or 
he re g A nex B ntries, the iss n r ctio ate he di n-
es b  the 2005 l o iss s a  th yot rge  hav o-
en to  the  missi edu n r s on he  5 le ls r han e si-
ns  001 base  r o e d  be use mis s i e co es 
ave  .4% betwe 200 nd 05. ing  d ce be en 
he 200 issi  leve targ ts w ld u eres  the  c-
e us  of  nd  M c  by g n-
 th mp yin ese  to 




6    See also Böhringer and Löschel (2003). In our simulations, assumptions regarding the 
disposition of excess permits in the REU, which are approximately 4.5 times smaller than 
those held by Russia and the Ukraine, yielded large changes in the permit prices. Allowing 
Russia and the Ukraine to sell their excess permits would drive the permit price close to ze-
ro. 16  Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments 
wh r not these sectors participate in an ether o  emission trading program. Using 
a single carbon tax implies that the emission targets between sectors within a 
e that this may differ from 
the outcome of the allocation process in the EU for the second period (2008 – 
country/region will be allocated optimally. We recogniz
2012) where trading sectors (i.e. industry and energy sectors) tend to get more 
allowances than would be optimal from a cost-efficiency perspective (e.g. Betz 
et al. 2006).  
4.2 BTA  Scenarios 
In the BTA scenarios, we consider alternative scenarios for determining the po-
wer of the BTA and what products are subject to the BTA. The power of the 
BTA is set equal to the percentage change in costs for sectors that are subject 
to the BTA.7 Two alternative sectoral coverage scenarios are considered. In the 
EUETS coverage scenario, the BTA is applied to those sectors that are covered 
directly by the EU ETS: ppp, p_c, nmm, and i_s. Because electricity is typically 
not traded, the BTA is not applied to ely. In the full coverage scenarios, the BTA 
is also applied to chemicals (crp) and non-ferrous metals (nfm). Because the 
production processes in these sectors are energy (electricity) intensive, interna-
tional competitiveness may be negatively affected by higher energy prices cau-
sed by the EU ETS.  
                                            
We also considered a second scenario where the power of the BTA was set at 80% of the 
percentage change in costs to reflect the potential cost change for a “best available techno-
logy.” Because the results of this scenario did not differ significantly, they are not reported 
in th
7  
is paper, but are available from the authors upon request. Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments  17 
 
5 Model  Results 
5.1  Implementing Kyoto Without BTA 
Because the potential impacts of a BTA policy will depend on the magnitude of 
the effects from implementing the Kyoto Protocol, we consider several alternati-
ve scenarios that vary the level of excess credits banked by the REU and the 
ability of firms to substitute away from energy commodities. Six different scena-
ve assumptions on credit banking by the 
σKE, σELY, σCOAL, and σFU are set 
PN, and the ROB reduce emissions by 4.9%, 
3.1%, and 5.7% respectively (for low elasticities of substitution) while their e-
mission reduction targets (relative to 2005 base levels) were 6.9%, 12.7%, and 
25.1% respectively. This lower level of emission abatement leads to a lower 
nominal carbon tax. Note that even if the REU sells its excess permits, because 
of lower marginal abatement costs in the REU, CO2 emissions are reduced by 
10.7%, compared to base emissions. By withholding some of all of the REU’s 
excess permits, fewer permits are available for the other Annex B countries to 
purchase, requiring greater emission abatement in those regions, leading to 
higher nominal carbon taxes.  
 
rios are considered. Three alternati
REU: none, 50%, and 100%. The values for 
equal to 0.1 and 0.25, except for the coal, oil, gas, and p_c sectors where all 
elasticities are set equal to zero. The results from these scenarios are listed in 
table 4.  
Whether or not the REU decides to sell its excess permits has a large impact on 
the nominal carbon tax, or the price of the permits. The nominal carbon tax 
when the REU does not bank any of its excess permits is roughly half of the 
nominal carbon tax if the REU banks all of its excess permits. This result holds 
regardless of the elasticities of substitution. Because the REU sells its excess 
permits to other Annex B countries, this reduces the amount of emission aba-
tement required in these countries to meet the Kyoto targets. If the REU sells all 
of its excess permits, the EU15, J18  Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments 
Table 4.   Simulation Results for Implementation of Kyoto Protocol 
 Low  Energy  Substitution
a High Energy Substitution
b
  REU Credit Banking  REU Credit Banking 
Variable None Half All None Half  All
Nominal Carbon Tax ($)  $14.39 $20.65 $27.46 $10.54 $15.12  $20.09
   
Change in CO2 Emissions  Percentage 
Australia 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.9  1.2
Rest of Annex B  -5.7 -7.7 -9.7 -6.0 -8.2  -10.
Rest of Asia  0.4 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.6  0.8
China/India 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4  0.6
Japan -3.1 -4.4 -5.6 -3.4 -4.7  -6.1
United States  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3  0.4
Central & South America  0.3 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.4  0.6
EU15 
4
-4.9 -6.8 -8.7 -4.8 -6.6  -8.5
0
-1.6 -1.7 -1.2 -1.5  -1.6
Iron and steel (i_s)  -4.7 -6.0 -6.9 -3.8 -4.8  -5.7
Non-ferrous metals (nfm)  -1.1 -0.9 -0.2 -1.2 -1.2  -0.9
Electricity (ely)  -6.3 -8.6 -10.9 -5.4 -7.4  -9.5
Rest of EU  -10.7 -14.4 -17.9 -10.6 -14.2  -17.7
Eastern Europe & FSU  0.7 1.0 1.3 0.7 0.9  1.2
Middle East & Africa  0.5 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.6  0.8
  Million Metric Tons CO2
Global Emission Reduction  -242.1 -330.7 -419.0 -235.9 -323.1 -410.2
Leakage 60.8 83.8 107.0 66.9 91.4  115.9
   
Output Percentage 
EU15   
Paper (ppp)  -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2  -0.3
Refined petroleum (p_c)  -3.6 -5.2 -6.8 -2.9 -4.1  -5.5
Chemicals (crp)  -0.6 -0.9 -1.2 -0.5 -0.7  -1.
Non-metalic mineral 
(nmm) -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3  -0.5
Iron and steel (i_s)  -0.4 -0.6 -0.9 -0.4 -0.6  -0.8
Non-ferrous metals (nfm)  -0.8 -1.1 -1.5 -0.7 -1.0  -1.4
Electricity (ely)  -2.0 -2.8 -3.7 -1.8 -2.5  -3.3
REU   
Paper (ppp)  0.6 1.0 1.6 0.2 0.4  0.7
Refined petroleum (p_c)  -9.5 -13.1 -16.7 -7.6 -10.6 -13.6
Chemicals (crp)  -2.9 -3.6 -4.2 -2.4 -3.0  -3.5
Non-metalic mineral (nmm)  -1.4
a Values  for  σKE, σELY, σCOAL, and σFU are equal to 0.1 except for the coal, oil, gas, and 
p_c sectors where all elasticities are equal to zero. 
b Values  of  σKE, σELY, σCOAL, and σFU are equal to 0.25 with the exceptions listed above. 
Banking credits into future periods may be rationalized by expected higher futu-
re carbon taxes due to more ambitious future emission reduction targets. For 
example, the European Council recommends emission reductions of 60-80% by Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments  19 
 
2050 for the EU to help limit the mean global temperature increase to 2°degrees 
Celsius compared to pre-ind opean -
ver, the future architecture of p  policies in er 
debate, including the allocation of emission reductions a  the M ber Sta
tes and the possible role of any banked AAUs  M r S  se
those targets. Similarly, it is not clear whether a fu rading Directi-
ve will again allow EU Member States to  tha
wil o their comp s. Thu emb tates y hav  ince
ve  excess credits   the future via their companies pa ating i
the  There is empiri evidenc hat  t REU embe ates a
tem cate allowance ther generously to their pani  phas
tw -2012 .g. Bet  al. 2 ). Fo ost RE S suc
a  y would be feasible ce the ill e  mee eir K target
Co n REU Member s ma n  fer a xces wanc
int
Increased banking of credits   REU a  CO
m o eat bon ge. 
banking of excess credits by the REU requires greater emission reductions in 
the Annex B countries to meet their Kyoto commitments, which reduces the 
global demand for energy commodities and leads to a reduction in the price of 
energy commodities. In the regions that  ot  men ate  ge po
cy  in the price nergy mo s pro s an ntive 
increase their use, leading to higher emissions in those countries and greater 
carbon leakage. The amount  akage  eas y app matel % whe
the ir exc  credit  par  whe bank e of 
ex
The ability of firms to substitute between and away from energy c oditie
du ocess  affec  p al co  imp ting 
Ky ncreasing the sticitie sub tion f  0.1 t 5 red
ce ax by , rega ss o e am  of excess cred
ba  leve  carbo akag lso in ses  to 10
be n non-Annex  gions  m asily stitu  energ
ustrialized levels (Eur  Council 2005). Howe
ost-Kyoto climate  the EU is still und
mong em -
 by the embe tates in tting 
ture Emission T
 control the number of allowances t 
l be allocated t anie s, M er S  ma e an nti-
 to bank any into rticip n 
 EU ETS. cal  e t mos  M r St t-
pted to allo s ra  com es in e 
o of the EU ETS (2008 ) (e z et 006 r m U M h 
strateg  sin y w asily t th yoto- s. 
mpanies i  State y the trans ny e s allo es 
o future periods. 
by the  also leads to larger incre ses in
 
2 e-
T issions in non-Annex B countries; in other w rds gr er car leaka he 
do n imple t clim chan li-
, the reduction  of e  com ditie vide  ince to 
of le incr es b roxi y 75 n 
 REU banks all of the ess com ed to n it  s non its 
cess credits. 
omm s 
ring the production pr  also ts the otenti st of lemen the 
oto Protocol. I  ela s of  stitu rom o 0.2 u-
s the nominal carbon t  27% rdle f th ount its 
nked by the REU. The l of n le e a crea by 8  % 
cause firms i B re  can ore e  sub te to y 
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Table 5 shows the degree to e na v ss 
accounts for the output changes within the energy-intensive sectors in the EU. 
The change in output in each energy-intensive sector is decomposed into chan-
ges attributable to import and export competitiveness. Note that a negative sign 
reflects a reduction in output from increased import competition or a reduction in 
output fr  decrease t  t r  at 
least two ird f t   , a ted 
with the m jority of this being a reduction in exports. The trade effects are much 
lower for ppp and   in the EU15 countries with less than one-third of the re-
duction in output from these sectors ributable to trade. In the REU, a xi-
mately 80% of the reduction in crp and 
proximately f the reduction  p_c, nmm, an fm is trade rela  A-
gain, the majority of these losses are due to loss of export sales.  
The impact of increas c  is 
much smaller than the reduction in 
ducts from these sectors are mainly used as intermediate inputs. So while the 
imported intermediate inputs will be less expensive than their EU counterparts, 
leading firms to substitute imported i inputs, the overall 
production in these sectors is also decreasing. Thus the substitution effects are 
offs y pansion (  th le ss 
of o e in pe m   sti-
tution effect is almost totally offset by the expansion effect.  
The only exception to the above discussion is the ppp sector in the REU  on; 
whe mplementin s ig ve 
the large reduction in CO2  in t U, t e ar ignificant r cti-
ons he out  o veral energy-intensive sectors, such as p_c, crp, i_s, and 
ely. Due to the model assumption that all primary factors of production (i.e., la-
bor and capital) are fully employed, the reduction in output leads to a decreased 
demand for the primary factors of production. This in turn leads to a reduction in 
their price. Because the REU has the largest reduction in emissions, it also has 
the largest reduction in to ric . Combined with the m e
perfectly competitive market rket price is equal to the aver
(and marginal) cost of production, the re
leads to the market price of ppp decreasin
reg . This enhanc pp U e 
incr e in ex rts a he 
expansion in production of ppp in the REU. 
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5.2 BTA  Scenarios 
The imposition of the BTA has two effects for the included sectors. First, the 
tariff imposed on imported products from non-Annex B countries will reduce the 
level of import competition by increasing the price within the EU of those pro-
ducts. With the exception of p_c, the BTA neutralizes the reduction in EU15 out-
put from increased import competition from the implementation of climate chan-
ge policies. This can be seen by comparing the results in the first column in 
table 5 for the EU15. For the sectors covered by the BTA, the reduction in out-
put from imports from implementing the Kyoto Protocol are replaced by zero or 
small positive effects after the imposition of the BTA. The BTA does not neutra-
lize the increased import competition for p_c in the EU15 because approximate-
ly three-quarters of all p_c imports in the EU15 are from the REU, REFSU, or 
from other EU15 countries. Thus, these imports are not subject to the BTA.  
nsive products from the non-EU re-
While the BTA is effective in neutralizing the increased import competition for 
most energy-intensive sectors in the EU15, it has little effect on import competi-
tiveness in the REU for two reasons. First, approximately 90% of all imports of 
energy-intensive products into the REU are from the EU15, REFSU, or other 
REU countries. As such, these imports are not subject to the BTA tariffs. Se-
cond, because most energy-intensive sectors in the REU are more carbon-
intensive than in the EU15, the exception being nfm, the post-tax prices for REU 
energy-intensive products are higher than their EU15 competitors. This helps to 
maintain the increased import competition in the REU. 
In implementing climate change policies, the largest impact on EU trade is a 
loss in export competitiveness. As shown in the second column of table 5, with 
the exception of p_c, the subsidies on exports of energy intensive products to 
the Non-Annex B countries lead to an increase in EU15 exports of these pro-
ducts. Thus, the loss in export competitiveness from implementing climate 
change policy is not just neutralized, but reversed. The BTA does effectively 
neutralize the increase in production costs on the cif prices of EU15 exports of 
energy intensive products to the Non-Annex B countries. However, while the cif 
prices for EU15 products remain constant, relative to the initial equilibrium, the 
cif prices of other exporters of energy intensive products do not remain 
constant. The implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and the BTA in the EU 
leads to producer price increases for ppp, crp, nmm, i_s, and nfm in all regions. 
The price increases in the Non-Annex B regions are due to increases in primary 
factor prices and the prices of non-energy inputs. This in turn leads to higher fob 
and cif prices for the exports of energy inteEconomic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments  23 
 
gions, leading to substitution towards energy-intensive products from the EU15 
ds 
. However, because the 
and away from all other regions. The BTA is not effective in neutralizing the loss 
in export competitiveness for p_c in the EU15 because approximately 80% of all 
exports go to other Annex B regions. 
Again, a BTA does little to mitigate the loss in export competitiveness for the 
REU for most energy-intensive sectors. This is because 80% to 90% of the 
REU exports of energy-intensive products goes to other Annex B regions, and 
therefore do not receive any subsidies. The exception is nfm, where the BTA 
does neutralize the loss in export competitiveness for the REU. This occurs be-
cause of increased nfm exports to the EU15. A relatively low carbon intensity in 
production along with a larger reduction in the prices of primary factors of pro-
duction in the REU yields a smaller increase in the cif price in the EU15 than the 
BTA tariff inclusive cif prices of nfm from the Non-Annex B countries. This lea
agents in the EU15 to purchase more nfm from the REU. Since approximately 
two-thirds of all nfm exports from the REU go to the EU15, the increase in ex-
ports to the EU15 is enough to offset the loss of export sales to other regions. 
By encouraging increased output of energy-intensive products in the EU, a BTA 
will lead to a higher carbon tax compared to the Kyoto only scenario. This is 
because with the same CO2 reduction targets for the Annex B countries, the 
less energy-intensive sectors and private households must reduce their CO2 
emissions more in the BTA scenario than the Kyoto scenario. This leads to hig-
her marginal abatement costs and a higher carbon tax
effects of implementing Kyoto on the output and production costs in the EU15 
for the sectors that are included in a BTA are relatively small, implementing a 
BTA does not lead to large changes in production. Therefore, the distribution of 
emission reductions across sectors, the private households, and regions do not 
change substantially and the increase in marginal abatement costs are small. 
With EUETS coverage, the carbon tax increases by about 0.25% while the full 
sector coverage increases the carbon tax by about 1%, regardless of the elasti-
city of substitution or level of REU permit banking (see table 6).  24  Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments 
Table 6.   Simulation Results for EU Implementation of Border Tax Ad-
justments 
 Low  Energy  Substitution
a High Energy Substitution
b







Nominal Carbon Tax ($)  $14.39  $14.43  $14.55  $10.54 $10.57  $10.63
   
Change in CO2 Emissions  Percentage 
Australia 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.7 
Rest of Annex B  -5.7 -5.7 -5.7 -6.0 -6.0  -6.1
Rest of Asia  0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 
China/India 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Japan -3.1 -3.2 -3.2 -3.4 -3.4 
United States  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Central & South America  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
EU15 -4.9 -4.9 -4.9 -4.8 -4.8 
Rest of EU  -10.7 -10.7 -10.8 -10.6 -10.6  -1
Eastern Europe & FSU  0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Middle East & Africa  0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 






















Global Emission Reduction  -242.1 -245.4 -249.9 -235.9 -238.2 -2
Leakage 60.8 57.4 52.9 66.9 64.7 
Output Percentage 
EU15   
Paper (ppp)  -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1  -0.1
Refined petroleum (p_c)  -3.6 -3.2 -3.1 -2.9 -2.6  -2.5
Chemicals (crp)  -0.6 -0.7 0.2 -0.5 -0.5 
Non-metalic mineral (nmm)  -0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 
Iron and steel (i_s)  -0.4 0.3 0.2 -0.4 0.2 
Non-ferrous metals (nfm)  -0.8 -0.8 0.2 -0.7 -0.7 
Electricity (ely)  -2.0 -2.0 -1.9 -1.8 -1.8  -1.7
REU   
Paper (ppp)  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.2 
Refined petroleum (p_c)  -9.5 -9.2 -9.3 -7.6 -7.4 
Chemicals (crp)  -2.9 -2.9 -2.4 -2.4 -2.4 
Non-metalic mineral (nmm)  -1.4 -1.1 -1.1 -1.2 -1.0  -1.0
Iron and steel (i_s)  -4.7 -4.2 -4.3 -3.8 -3.4  -3.5
Non-ferrous metals (nfm)  -1.1 -1.2 -0.6 -1.2 -1.3  -0.9
Electricity (ely)  -6.3 -6.3 -6.3 -5.4 -5.4  -5.4
a Values  for  σKE, σELY, σCOAL, and σFU are equal to 0.1 except for the coal, oil, gas, and 
p_c sectors where all elasticities are equal to zero. 
σ σ σ σ b Values  of  KE,  ELY,  COAL, and  FU are equal to 0.25 with the exceptions listed above. 
c  Implementation of Kyoto without BTA. REU does not bank any excess emission credits. 
d  Sectors included in BTA: ppp, p_c, nmm, and i_s. 
e  Sectors included in BTA: ppp, p_c, nmm, i_s, crp, and nfm. 
 
Even though the impact on the magnitude of the carbon tax is small, any inc-
rease will adversely affect the energy-intensive sectors not included in a BTA. 
Under a BTA applied to the EUETS sectors, both crp and nfm experience a lar-Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments  25 
 
ger reduction in production compared to the Kyoto only scenario (see table 6). 
This occurs because the higher carbon tax leads to further increases in the cost 
f production for these secto Kyoto o
rther increases import competition and reduces export co iven
ons in o r e, ea   ne
y-intensive sectors will want to be included in the BTA. 
One of the stated benefits of a   is to uce th mount of carbon leakage 
from the partial regional adoption of climate change policies. As shown in table 
6, the impacts on carbon leakage are relatively small: a 3% to 6% reduction in 
leakage wit S coverage  an 8  13% uction eakag r full 
sectoral coverage. This corresponds to about a 2.5 million mt. to 8 million mt. 
reduction in CO2 emissions globally due to reduced leakage. 
In terms of welfare, the imposit of a B has litt ddition ffects  qui-
alent variation (EV) in the EU15 and REU compared to change in EV for 
 Prot itho TA. s th ren rio
ticity of substitution va s, ther  to 2% difference in the 
en a BTA is implemented compared to when it is not implemented. This 
ce is due to the s l powe f the B . With  value r the 
elasticities of substitution, the powers of the BTA ranges from 0.3% to 1.4% 
w t bank  exce credits to 0.5% to 2.8% when the 
R its excess credits. The p_c and i_s sector ve the hest 
po lowest  er acr  all scenarios. For the higher value 
 elasticity of substitution, the powers of the BTA are 25% to 35% lower 
across all scenarios.  
o rs, compared to the  nly scenario, which 
fu mpetit ess. While 
the additional reducti utput a e not larg  they cl rly show that all e r-
g
BTA  red e a
h EUET  and % to  red  in l e fo
ion  TA  le a al e on e
v
implementing the Kyoto ocol w ut a B  Acros e diffe t scena s 
and elas lue e is only a 1%
EV wh
small differen mal rs o TA  low s fo
hen the REU does no  any ss 
EU banks all of  s ha  hig
wer and ppp has the  pow oss
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6 Conclusions 
The principle purpose of a BTA is to address competitive distortions resulting 
from the partial implementation of global climate change policies, such as the 
EU ETS. Our model results illustrate this concern. The energy-intensive sectors 
in the EU15 and REU face increased import competition and a loss of export
sales when implementing the Kyoto Protocol without a BT
 
A. This effect was 
ced under a BTA 
 increase the marginal abatement costs (carbon 
tax) required to achieve the emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Proto-
col. The marginal abatement costs increase by less than 1%. This is because 
the impacts on the energy-intensive sectors in the EU15 of implementing Kyoto 
without a BTA are small and most REU trade in energy intensive products is 
between regions not subject to the BTA. The small increase in marginal abate-
ment costs implies that the BTA will not lead to significant changes in the distri-
bution of emission reductions across sectors and regions. Thus, implementing a 
BTA will not significantly reduce the carbon leakage from a partial implementa-
tion of climate change policies.  
While the carbon tax rates predicted from our model are in the range of current 
market prices for EU allowances, once discounting is applied, of around € 15 for 
phase 2 of the EU ETS (2008-2012), there are several limitations of the model. 
much higher in the REU due to the higher carbon content in its energy intensive 
products. For most energy-intensive sectors in the EU15, implementing a BTA 
will neutralize the increased import competition and more than neutralize the 
loss in export sales. The BTA is not effective for the p_c sector because the 
majority of EU15 trade is with regions that are not subject to the BTA. Export 
sales of energy intensive products from the EU15 are enhan
because the export subsidy offsets the increase in EU15 production costs while 
the partial implementation of Kyoto leads to higher prices for energy intensive 
goods in all other regions. Thus, by offsetting the price/cost increase in the 
EU15, the BTA enhances the export competitiveness of the energy-intensive 
sectors rather than just eliminating any loss of competitiveness.  
While the BTA is effective for most energy-intensive sectors in the EU15, in ge-
neral it is not effective for the energy-intensive sectors in the REU. This is be-
cause approximately 80% to 90% of REU trade in energy intensive products is 
with regions that are not subject to the BTA: the EU15, the REFSU, and other 
REU countries.  
Even though implementing a BTA will encourage production in energy-intensive 
sectors, it does not substantiallyEconomic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments  27 
 
First, a static model cannot account for the expected growth in emissions from 
work from the Prof-X
2-fellowship program by the Fraun-
expanding economies like China and India. Second, the model does not allow 
for effects which tend to lower the price of carbon, like the use of CDM by An-
nex B countries, technology transfer through CDM projects in developing count-
ries, or price-induced technological change in the model. Third, the base year of 
the database is 2001. Because Annex B countries have increased emissions 
since 2001, updating the database to a more recent year, such as 2005, would 
likely yield higher carbon taxes due to more stringent emission reduction effects 
and would therefore increase the effects of BTAs. However, since the carbon 
content of some products in Non-Annex B regions may have decreased since 
2001, due to technological progress, would tend to lessen the effects of imple-
menting a BTA. Finally, the effects of BTAs on competition and leakage vary 
with the regional coverage. In particular, these effects would be more pronoun-
ced if the EU decided to impose BTAs on all regions which do not commit to 
substantial greenhouse gas emission reductions in a post Kyoto climate regime, 
including current Annex B regions.  
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